Sunday, June 22, 2008

A question Prabhakaran must be asked - Island Editorial

The LTTE owes its existence to naivety of successive governments which sought to make war and peace according to its agenda. Whenever Prabhakaran landed himself in trouble, he managed to gain a breather simply by waving a white flag. He used the time so gained to regroup, rearm, infiltrate the southern areas and expand and step up its extortion operations. Every ceasefire meant a new lease of life for the outfit since Operation Liberation (1987), which would have accounted for him, if not for India's intervention and the subsequent 'peace process' which resulted in humiliation for India and disaster for Sri Lanka, thanks to blunders committed on both sides of the Palk Straits.

A sure sign of the LTTE being in difficulty is its call for a ceasefire. When the roaring Tigers receive a thorough beating, they coo like doves and their minders go running to the international community seeking its intervention. One sees that happening at present. Their campaign to secure a breather for the Tigers trapped in the Wanni has got into the Over Drive mode. They have suddenly realized the value of life and begun weeping buckets for civilians dying in terror attacks. It is a pity that they did nothing to prevent the LTTE from resuming war three years ago!

Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremenayake has told a newly accredited foreign envoy that talks are not possible unless and until the LTTE eschews violence and lays down arms. This will never happen. For, the LTTE has crossed the Rubicon in its terrorist war and its survival hinges upon remaining armed and unleashing violence. It may have done as the Prime Minister says within the first few years of its armed struggle but now it has become a prisoner of its own violence. Or, it may be able to wean itself away from terrorism under a different leadership. With Prabhakaran and his cohorts at the helm, the LTTE will never be able to give up arms and violence. The LTTE cannot exist in a democratic environment.

The LTTE has no way of escape now. It desperately needs a ceasefire which will cause the freezing of the troop positions and an MoU which will permit it to engage in 'political work' (read consolidation of its power) in the Eastern Province again. It is also in need of some kind of talks to be held overseas at a time when its fronts are being targeted by foreign governments as in Canada and Italy. Such crackdowns wouldn't have come at a worse time for the LTTE, whose morale is at a low ebb. A ceasefire will enable its fronts abroad to have a breather.

A ceasefire is a worrisome proposition for the government, as it will militate against the implementation of the Indian remedy which the LTTE has rejected lock, stock and barrel. The government cannot afford to offer anything more to the LTTE as its breakaway group the TMVP led by Chief Minister S. Chandrakanthan has agreed to the 13th Amendment and is trying to make it work in the East.

If anyone is desirous of a ceasefire, it is not the government that should be pressured to stop war but the LTTE. For, it was Prabhakaran who resumed the present phase of war in Nov. 2005, even before President Mahinda Rajapaksa had been properly ensconced in power. Barely two weeks after President Rajapaksa's induction, Prabhakaran in his heroes' day speech promised war and began claymore mine attacks on military and police personnel soon afterwards. Then he captured the Mavil Aru reservoir in 2006 depriving thousands of people of access to water thus causing a dilly-dallying President Rajapaksa to take up a stand. Hadn't the government decided to take on the LTTE, Prabhakaran, true to form, would have captured other irrigations works in the East as well. And, that was the time when the Trincomalee harbor was well within the range of heavy weapons of the LTTE, which after the resumption of war successfully shelled parts thereof.

Prabhakaran is said to be a good strategist but he blundered badly by resuming war in 2005. He may have wanted to unsettle President Rajapaksa from the word go so that he would not be able to counter the LTTE effectively. But, that proved to be a disastrous military miscalculation as its consequences have demonstrated. He must be regretting having ever done so!

There is a limit to Prabhakaran's resistance. He cannot hold out for ever in the Wanni as he has no way of replenishing supplies and the morale of his cadres is sagging due to being encircled. They cannot fight on several fronts at the same time to ward off the military juggernaut their boss has set in motion. On the LTTE's own admission, the army is also active deep inside its territory, which it once claimed to be impregnable and isn't this ample proof that Prabhakaran is getting beaten at his own game?

Prabhakaran has been targeting civilians at a rate and will continue to do so in a bid to pressure the government to abandon the war. Wounded, the Tigers are more ferocious. And they are likely to step up its killing spree in time to come. But, nothing is going to work for Prabhakaran this time round as the country has over the years learnt to remain resilient.

Those who are campaigning for a ceasefire must ask Prabhakaran a very simple question: "Are you willing to give up Eelam and settle for anything less?"

If his answer is in the negative, then the question is whether there is any point in trying to talk peace with him under the delusion that he might change his mind someday.

The LTTE owes its existence to naivete of successive governments which mistakenly sought to make war and peace according to its agenda. Whenever Prabhakaran landed himself in trouble, he managed to gain a breather simply by waving a white flag. He used the time so gained to regroup, rearm, infiltrate the southern areas and expand and step up its extortion operations. Every ceasefire meant a new lease of life for the outfit since Operation Liberation (1987), which would have accounted for him, if not for India's intervention and the subsequent 'peace process' which resulted in humiliation for India and disaster for Sri Lanka, thanks to blunders committed on both sides of the Palk Straits.

A sure sign of the LTTE being in difficulty is its call for a ceasefire. When the roaring Tigers receive a thorough beating, they coo like doves and their minders go running to the international community seeking its intervention. One sees that happening at present. Their campaign to secure a breather for the Tigers trapped in the Wanni has got into the Over Drive mode. They have suddenly realised the value of life and begun weeping buckets for civilians dying in terror attacks. It is a pity that they did nothing to prevent the LTTE from resuming war three years ago!

Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremenayake has told a newly accredited foreign envoy that talks are not possible unless and until the LTTE eschews violence and lays down arms. This will never happen. For, the LTTE has crossed the Rubicon in its terrorist war and its survival hinges upon being armed and unleashing violence. It may have been able to do as the Prime Minister says within the first few years of its armed struggle but now it has become a prisoner of its own violence. Or, it may be able to wean itself away from terrorism under a different leadership. With Prabhakaran and his cohorts at the helm, the LTTE will never be able to give up arms and violence. It cannot exist in a democratic environment.

The LTTE has no way of escape now. It desperately needs a ceasefire which will cause the freezing of the troop positions and an MoU which will permit it to engage in 'political work' (read consolidation of its power) in the Eastern Province again. It is also in need of some kind of talks to be held overseas at a time when its fronts are being targeted by foreign governments as in Canada and Italy. Such crackdowns couldn't have come at a worse time for the LTTE, whose morale is at a low ebb. A ceasefire will enable its international fronts to have a breather.

A ceasefire is a worrisome proposition for the government, as it will militate against the implementation of the Indian remedy which the LTTE has rejected lock, stock and barrel. The government cannot afford to offer anything more to the LTTE as its breakaway group the TMVP led by Chief Minister S. Chandrakanthan has agreed to the 13th Amendment and is trying to make it work in the East. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that India will endorse a devolution package that goes beyond her quasi federalism.

If anyone is desirous of a ceasefire, it is not the government that should be pressured to stop war but the LTTE. For, it was Prabhakaran who resumed the present phase of war in Nov. 2005, even before President Mahinda Rajapaksa had been properly ensconced in power. Barely two weeks after President Rajapaksa's induction, Prabhakaran in his heroes' day speech promised war and began claymore mine attacks on military and police personnel soon afterwards. Then he captured the Mavil Aru reservoir in 2006 depriving thousands of people of access to water thus causing a dilly-dallying President Rajapaksa to take a stand. Hadn't the government decided to take on the LTTE, Prabhakaran, true to form, would have captured other irrigation works in the East as well. And, that was the time when the Trincomalee harbour was well within the range of heavy weapons of the LTTE, which after the resumption of war successfully shelled parts thereof.

Prabhakaran is said to be a good strategist but he blundered badly by resuming war in 2005. He may have wanted to unsettle President Rajapaksa from the word go so that the latter would not be able to counter the LTTE effectively. But, that proved to be a disastrous military miscalculation as its consequences have demonstrated. He must be regretting having ever done so!

There is a limit to Prabhakaran's resistance. He cannot hold out for ever in the Wanni as he has no way of replenishing supplies and the morale of his cadres is sagging due to being encircled. They cannot fight on several fronts at the same time to ward off the military juggernaut their boss has set in motion. On the LTTE's own admission, the army is also active deep inside its territory, which it once claimed to be impregnable and isn't this ample proof that Prabhakaran is getting beaten at his own game?

Prabhakaran has been targeting civilians at a rate and will continue to do so in a bid to pressure the government to abandon its war effort. Wounded, the Tigers are more ferocious. And they are likely to step up its killing spree in time to come. But, nothing is going to work for Prabhakaran this time round as the country has over the years learnt to remain resilient.

Those who are campaigning for a ceasefire must ask Prabhakaran a very simple question: "Are you willing to give up Eelam and settle for anything less?"

If his answer is in the negative, then the question is whether there is any point in trying to talk peace with him under the delusion that he might change his mind someday.

Courtesy : The Island

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